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Disparities, Measurement and Time: Three Things That Decide How Bad an Outbreak Gets

Opinion

When we talk about pandemic preparedness, we usually talk about pathogens, vaccines and laboratories. I want to argue that three less visible things decide how badly an outbreak goes: who can reach care, what we are able to count, and how long everything takes. Health disparities, health measurement and time are not separate problems. Each one makes the other two worse.

Disparities

The clearest recent example is the COVID-19 vaccine. One modelling study estimated that vaccination prevented about 19.8 million deaths worldwide in its first year, nearly two thirds of the deaths that would otherwise have occurred.1 That benefit was not shared evenly. The same study estimated that roughly 600,000 more deaths would have been averted if every country had reached the World Health Organization’s target of vaccinating 40% of its population by the end of 2021.1

The gap is not only between countries. Within countries, the burden of a pandemic follows the lines that already existed: income, housing, work and chronic disease.2 People who cannot afford to stay home, or who live far from a clinic, are exposed more and treated later.

This is usually framed as a question of fairness, and it is one. It is also a question of control. An outbreak that is left to run in one place leaves everyone else exposed for longer.

Measurement

We cannot respond to what we cannot see. The World Health Organization estimates that 14.83 million more people died in 2020 and 2021 than would have been expected, which is 2.74 times the 5.42 million COVID-19 deaths that countries reported.3 Most of that difference is not concealment. It is the absence of a system that records deaths at all.

Before the pandemic, nearly 40% of the world’s deaths were not registered.4 A country that cannot count its dead cannot show the scale of its need, cannot direct a response to the places that need it, and cannot tell afterwards whether the response worked. Weak measurement also feeds back into disparity: resources tend to follow the numbers, and the places with the fewest numbers are often the places with the greatest burden.

Time

Every outbreak is a race, and delay is measured in cases. In the West African Ebola epidemic, the first known death was in December 2013. The World Health Organization was notified of the outbreak in March 2014.5 For about three months the virus spread without being recognised.

Since then, timeliness has become something that can be measured. The 7-1-7 target asks that a suspected outbreak be detected within 7 days of emergence, that public health authorities be notified within 1 day, and that an effective response be in place within 7 days.6 Its value is that it turns “act faster” into a number a ministry can be held to.

Time also matters at the level of a household. Grossman’s model of health as a form of capital treats a person’s own time as one of the things they must spend to stay healthy.7 For a daily wage earner, a day spent travelling to a clinic is a day’s income lost. Delay in seeking care is therefore not only about distance or awareness. It is about what time costs the people who have least of it to spare.

How the three compound

Disparity delays care. Delay, together with weak measurement, hides an outbreak while it is still small. A hidden outbreak attracts few resources, which widens the disparity it started from. None of the three can be fixed alone.

What follows

I draw three modest conclusions.

  1. Civil registration and routine surveillance are preparedness infrastructure, not administration. They deserve core budget, not project funding.
  2. Timeliness should be measured and reported, outbreak by outbreak, so that delays become visible and can be corrected.
  3. Equitable access to vaccines, diagnostics and primary care is part of outbreak control, not a separate agenda.

I made the case for national ownership of these investments in Bangladesh in an earlier piece. The argument here is the general one behind it: the countries with the least capacity to count, to reach people and to act quickly are the ones where the next outbreak is most likely to go unnoticed for longest.

References

  1. Watson OJ, Barnsley G, Toor J, Hogan AB, Winskill P, Ghani AC. Global impact of the first year of COVID-19 vaccination: a mathematical modelling study. Lancet Infectious Diseases. 2022;22(9):1293–1302. doi:10.1016/S1473-3099(22)00320-6
  2. Bambra C, Riordan R, Ford J, Matthews F. The COVID-19 pandemic and health inequalities. Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health. 2020;74(11):964–968. doi:10.1136/jech-2020-214401
  3. Msemburi W, Karlinsky A, Knutson V, Aleshin-Guendel S, Chatterji S, Wakefield J. The WHO estimates of excess mortality associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. Nature. 2023;613:130–137. doi:10.1038/s41586-022-05522-2
  4. World Health Organization. SCORE for health data technical package: global report on health data systems and capacity, 2020. Geneva: WHO; 2021. who.int/publications/i/item/9789240018709
  5. Baize S, Pannetier D, Oestereich L, et al. Emergence of Zaire Ebola virus disease in Guinea. New England Journal of Medicine. 2014;371(15):1418–1425. doi:10.1056/NEJMoa1404505
  6. Frieden TR, Lee CT, Bochner AF, Buissonnière M, McClelland A. 7-1-7: an organising principle, target, and accountability metric to make the world safer from pandemics. Lancet. 2021;398(10300):638–640. doi:10.1016/S0140-6736(21)01250-2
  7. Grossman M. On the concept of health capital and the demand for health. Journal of Political Economy. 1972;80(2):223–255. doi:10.1086/259880

First published on One Health Bangladesh, January 22, 2025 · Rewritten with references, November 2026